Mozambique’s Turn Toward Stability, Growth, and Reform

By Wallace Mawire*

Mozambique’s political landscape entered a new chapter in early 2025 as President Daniel Chapo officially took office following a decisive victory in the 2024 general elections. A former governor and longstanding figure within the ruling FRELIMO party, Chapo now leads one of Africa’s most strategically positioned nations, which is home to vast energy reserves, a fragile post-conflict peace process, and significant foreign investment interests.

As his administration marks its first months in power, President Chapo is being closely watched for how he will navigate Mozambique’s economic recovery, consolidate fragile stability in the north, and differentiate his leadership style from that of his predecessor, Filipe Nyusi, who stepped down after a decade at the helm.

Who is Daniel Chapo?

A trained lawyer and former governor of Inhambane Province, Chapo emerged as a consensus candidate within FRELIMO after the party opted against more polarizing figures. His technocratic background and relatively low national profile allowed him to campaign as a bridge-builder—someone more focused on solutions than political infighting.

Analysts describe Chapo as pragmatic, reserved, and strategic, a departure from Nyusi’s often militarized, security-heavy approach. “He is more of a soft-power president,” says political scientist Adriano Nuvunga, adding, “but that also means people are still trying to define his leadership style.”

Stability Returns to Cabo Delgado?

A defining challenge of the last several years has been the insurgency in northern Cabo Delgado province. Since 2017, Islamist militants affiliated with ISIS have launched attacks across the region, resulting in over 4,000 deaths and the displacement of nearly a million people. Under Nyusi, the government brought in Rwandan and Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops, which succeeded in reclaiming key towns like Mocímboa da Praia and Palma.

Under Chapo, security operations have continued, but with a broader emphasis on reconstruction, humanitarian access, and community reintegration. In one of his earliest field visits as president, Chapo traveled to Cabo Delgado to meet with local leaders and displaced residents. His administration has promised increased investment in health, education, and roads in the north, alongside tighter oversight of military operations to avoid human rights abuses.

“There is a new tone,” says a humanitarian worker in Pemba. “We are hearing less about ‘crushing terrorists’ and more about ‘rebuilding communities.’ That matters.”

Still, the threat remains. Sporadic attacks continue in remote areas, and analysts warn against declaring full victory. But the improved security climate has paved the way for the return of some key economic players.

LNG Projects Regain Momentum

Perhaps the most significant economic signal under Chapo has been the revival of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) mega-projects, especially those involving TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil.

TotalEnergies halted its $20 billion LNG project in Palma in 2021 following a deadly insurgent attack. However, following improved security guarantees and local engagement, the company announced in early 2025 that it was preparing for a phased return. Meanwhile, ExxonMobil and Eni are also advancing parallel offshore gas developments.

These projects are transformative. Mozambique’s LNG reserves are among the largest in Africa, and revenues from their export could reshape the national economy—if managed well.

President Chapo has emphasized transparency and local benefits. “The resources of Mozambique must serve the Mozambican people,” he said in a recent public address. To that end, his government has promised stronger regulation of procurement processes, more community engagement in resource-rich zones, and greater oversight of sovereign wealth fund management.

However, watchdogs warn that Mozambique still bears the scars of the “hidden debt” scandal, which saw over $2 billion in secret loans and led to international condemnation and donor withdrawal under Nyusi. Chapo has so far pledged to avoid such pitfalls, though implementation will be closely scrutinized.

Public Reception and Political Outlook

Domestically, Chapo has enjoyed something of a honeymoon period. His quieter, more conciliatory tone has been welcomed by civil society. While he remains firmly aligned with FRELIMO orthodoxy, he has refrained from using inflammatory rhetoric and has met with religious leaders, opposition parties, and youth groups to signal a more inclusive approach.

That said, critics warn of continued constraints on civic space. While the government has relaxed some media regulations, recent arrests of journalists and activists have sparked concern. “It’s too early to say Mozambique is opening up,” says a representative of the Media Institute of Southern Africa. “But there’s at least a willingness to listen.”

Politically, Chapo faces the dual challenge of rejuvenating FRELIMO while responding to growing urban discontent and youth unemployment. The opposition party RENAMO remains a force, though it remains fractured after recent internal struggles. Meanwhile, a rising class of independent civil actors is demanding accountability, particularly in how gas revenues will be spent.

Diplomacy and Regional Standing

On the diplomatic front, Chapo has moved swiftly to reassert Mozambique’s position in both the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU). In March 2025, he hosted the Angolan and Tanzanian presidents for a tripartite summit on cross-border infrastructure and security cooperation.

He has also prioritized relations with donors and investors. The European Union and World Bank have cautiously resumed budgetary support, and in April, Mozambique signed new infrastructure financing agreements with China and the African Development Bank.

Notably, Chapo used his first speech to the United Nations to underscore Mozambique’s role in global energy markets while calling for fair climate finance access. “We contribute little to global emissions,” he said, “but we bear the brunt of climate disasters. Justice demands investment in both mitigation and development.”

Comparing to the Nyusi Era

Filipe Nyusi’s presidency was marked by a hands-on, often militarized approach to security and a centralization of executive power. Nyusi played a direct role in negotiating with insurgents and often framed development through the lens of national unity and security resilience.

By contrast, Chapo appears more consultative. He has delegated more authority to regional governors and ministers and emphasized technocratic governance. However, some observers argue that the real power structures within FRELIMO remain unchanged.

A telling difference lies in tone. Nyusi was often combative in defending his administration; Chapo tends to de-escalate. “There is less theater and more listening,” says political analyst Borges Nhamirre. “That’s promising—but it must be matched by action.”

Looking Ahead

President Daniel Chapo’s first few months have set a cautiously optimistic tone. His challenge is formidable: to maintain peace in the north, manage expectations over gas wealth, restore trust in public institutions, and offer real economic opportunities to a country where over half the population lives in poverty.

But observers say his early steps suggest a leader seeking consensus, not confrontation. “He’s walking a tightrope,” says an economist with the International Growth Centre in Maputo. “The resources are coming. But whether they deliver results will depend on discipline, reform, and public accountability.

Mozambique stands at a crossroads. If Chapo can maintain peace, harness gas wealth, and protect civic space, his presidency could usher in a new era. But the risks of backsliding, into conflict, corruption, or exclusion, remain real.

*Culled from June Issue of PAV Magazine