By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
With its Russia-Africa Partnership Forum Action Plan (2023-2026), approved finally as a working document by the Kremlin, Russia faces a long meandering road, especially in implementing several bilateral agreements signed with African countries. While maneuvering around challenges and obstacles inside Africa, Russia has not fixed concretely financial budget for development projects. Worse, Russia’s financial institutions are unprepared to invest capital in Africa, reflecting comparative low dynamics in resetting its economic influence in Africa. Russia has, therefore, lagged far behind its geopolitical rhetorics and propaganda.
On June 4, under the chairmanship of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, a meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation was held on the topic “Furthering Russia’s cooperation with Africa.” While the meeting underscored the priority status of comprehensive relations with the African continent in line with the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation approved by the President in 2023, it also reminded preparations for the second ministerial conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, scheduled to take place this year in an African state, as a key milestone ahead of the third Russia-Africa Summit in 2026.
After two historic Russia-Africa summits, several conferences and bilateral meetings intended to move Russia’s relations from stagnation to growth, from low-level to a higher stage within the context of geopolitical competition and rivalry, have hit institutional obstacles. Russia’s decision to quit the investment landscape could largely be attributed African leaders’ inability to create a favourable climate, un-preparedness to change rules and regulations for foreign corporate businesses to operate in Africa. Russia still lags behind in implementing its Action Plan Agenda 2023-26. Policy researchers and experts underline that African leaders have to be blamed for Russian businesses quitting Africa.
Since the first Russia-Africa summit held in 2019, Russia has significantly reset its focus on investing in Africa’s economy, engaged in appreciably resonating public relations. The loudest was the planned construction of nuclear energy plants in West Africa and South Africa. African leaders, policymakers, business leaders and investors are rethinking alternative dynamic development models within the context of changing situation in the global economy. It is no secret that African leaders are currently adopting a new psychology towards success that is connected to economic development in the continent. In practical terms, African business directors are moving away from reactive to proactive positions in order to improve bilateral situation with Europe and the United States.
The leaders are more concerned about the rising youth unemployment and social standing of the population. Across Africa, 50-60% of the population is below the age of 25, according to United Nations reports. Leaders are also worried over their political campaign promises. Rhetoric and popular slogans such as ‘international friendship and solidarity’ are now geopolitical tools of the past – the Soviet era.
These trends may have far-reaching implications particularly for Russia. Notwithstanding that however, Russia has to develop integrated strategies for re-asserting visible economic influence in Africa. That is what Africa needs in this changing times.
In late May 2025, the Russian media Interfax reported, quoting the press service of Russian state bank VTB, that the shareholders of Banco VTB Africa voted at a general meeting to approve a decision to liquidate the bank. “Work is now being done with the regulator (the National Bank of Angola) to make the relevant decisions on the arrangements for working on the liquidation in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Angola,” VTB said. It was anticipated that the Angolan subsidiary’s license was to be terminated finally in this summer. VTB previously owned 50.1% of Banco VTB Africa and the president of Angolan state company Endiama, Antonio Carlos Sumbula owned the other 49.9%.
VTB focuses on work in Russia and in countries with a large volume of foreign trade. In early March, Russia’s VTB head Andrei Kostin, said in an interview with the French newspaper Les Echos, that the VTB would sell its subsidiary bank in Angola due to sanctions. VTB was added to the United States and European Union (EU) sanctions lists, which hit the bank’s international business hard, following the launch of the military operation in Ukraine in February 2022.
Russia contributed tremendously in South Africa’s political struggle. The outlook of bilateral relations is excellent. Russia’s low level of economic investment is however noticeable. Russia accounts for a paltry 2% of South Africa’s trade, while the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union account for a combined 35% – with China around 9%. Mark-Anthony Johnson notes in his August 2023 opinion piece published in Business & Financial Times, that “South Africa risks becoming bankrupt for its relationship with Russia, which adds virtually nothing to the economy, state revenues, economic growth, job creation, socioeconomic stability and investor sentiment.” South Africa has been hit with problems ranging from energy deficits, collapsing industrial production and rising tensions among the large labour force.
Despite consistent assurances made by high-ranking Russian officials that Africa is “in the mainstream of Russia’s foreign policy,” there has been little practical activities. A number of Russian companies have under-performed in Africa. Corporate Russian companies have a negative attitude towards Africa.
Russia has abandoned its lucrative platinum project contract about 50 km northwest of Harare, the Zimbabwean capital. Reasons for the abrupt termination of the bilateral contract have still not been made public, but Zimbabwe’s Centre for Natural Resource Governance pointed to lack of capital (source of finance) for the project. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov launched the US$3 billion Russian project back in 2014, with the hope of raising its economic profile in Zimbabwe. The development of the platinum deposit in Darwendale involves a consortium consisting of the Rostekhnologii State Corporation, Vneshekonombank and Vi Holding in a joint venture with some private Zimbabwe investors as well as the Zimbabwean government.
Russia was simply offered the lucrative mining concession without participating in any tender. After the project launch, Brigadier General Mike Nicholas Sango, Zimbabwe’s Ambassador to the Russian Federation, told me in an email that “Russia’s biggest economic commitment to Zimbabwe to date was its agreement in September 2014 to invest US$3 billion in what is Zimbabwe’s largest platinum mine”.
Zimbabwe has the world’s second-largest platinum reserves after South Africa. With the rapidly geopolitical changes, Mnangagwa has been committed to opening up Zimbabwe’s economy to the rest of the world in order to attract the much-needed foreign direct investment to revive the ailing economy and make maximum use of the opportunities for bolstering and implementing a number of large projects in the country.
The 40 years diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and Russia have not yielded a single industrial facility to boast of in that country.
Prior to holding the first Russia-Africa summit, Norilsk Nickel terminated its deal with Botswana’s BCL Group. According to TASS News Agency, quoting the company’s media release in December 2018, Norilsk Nickel terminated its agreement to sell African assets to Botswana’s BCL Group, including a 50% stake in the Nkomati joint venture. It said that the Russian company would seek damages from the BCL Group for the losses it suffered due to BCL’s failure to meet the terms of the agreement. The termination of the agreement would also enable Norilsk Nickel to pursue its own strategy for the African assets, Michael Marriott, Norilsk Nickel Africa’s Chief Executive, said as quoted by the press service.
In the East African region, Russia’s RT-Global Resources and Rosneft quit Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s oil refinery project and many major infrastructure deals. Russia had pledged US$4 billion but later disagreements over terms and frustration over in-fighting, intrigue and lobbying forced them to pull out of the country. The Ugandan government team noted that the Russian consortium exhibited inadequate assurance and availability of preferred alternative foreign contractors with comparatively high bidding terms.
Rosneft also abandoned its interest in the southern Africa oil pipeline construction, soon after its delegation in Angola had discussed the possible participation of the Kremlin-controlled company in exploration and development projects there.
Lukoil, one of the Russia’s biggest oil companies, like many Russian companies, has had a long history of shuttling, forward and backward, with declaration of business intentions in tapping into oil and gas resources in Africa. Besides technical and geographical hitches, Lukoil noted explicitly in an official report on its website that “the African leadership and government policies always pose serious problems to operations in the region.” Lukoil pulled out of the oil and gas exploration and drilling project that it began in Sierra Leone. According to Interfax, the local Russian news agency, the company did not currently have any projects and has backed away due to poor exploration results in Sierra Leone. It was reported that drilling in West Africa, including in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, did not bring Lukoil the expected results, as preliminary technical results did not demonstrate commercial hydrocarbon reserves. Vice-President Leonid Fedun ruled Lukoil’s complete withdrawal from almost all projects in West Africa.
Under the aegis of resetting its bilateral economic relations with Nigeria, Russians along the line declared to revamp the Ajaokuta Iron and Steel Complex that was abandoned after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and further wanted to take up energy, oil and gas projects, as well as facilitate bilateral trade. Nigeria is one of the Africa’s fastest growing economies and it boosts the largest population. It is currently estimated at 220 million people, and this is, more or less, a huge market potential for prospective foreign investors, further presents many investment opportunities. Foreign Minister Lavrov held a review meeting with his Nigerian counterpart Minister Chief Ojo Mbila Maduekwe and emphatically noted that Moscow was prepared to offer trade preferences to Nigeria. Then, Vice President Kashim Shettima headed the Nigerian delegation to attend that second Russia-Africa summit in St Petersburg. Foreign Minister Yusuf Maitama Tuggar was among the group. Following that, Maitama Tuggar again held talks in March 2024 at the Foreign Ministry. But it conclusively showed, Russia terribly failed to grant ‘trade preference’ it had promised during several Russian-Nigerian bilateral meetings on Smolenskiy Plochad. Until today, Russia, as a reliable partner, has never honoured its promise of extending trade preferences, in practical terms, to Nigeria. Extending trade preferences was interpreted as an integral part of strengthening bilateral economic and trade cooperation between the two countries.
Russian trade experts and business consultants have been discussing ways to improve economic cooperation with Africa. One analytical report indicated that a number of large Russian companies operating in Africa managed to establish themselves negatively in African countries. This is primarily due to ignorance of cultural peculiarities of the region, lack of social responsibility, failure to completely fulfill contractual obligations. These cases damage the image of Russia and Russian companies with entering the African market.
According to expert policy narratives, Russian-African economic cooperation and partnerships continue to face challenges and obstacles, including inadequate knowledge of the Africa’s investment landscape and lack of appreciable state support, while Moscow seems to increasingly prioritize anti-Western rhetoric and political confrontation in the context of the great power competition in Africa. African leaders largely prefer to play neutral positions and act in strategic balancing ways.
Russian companies have been exiting Africa primarily due to geopolitical shifts, economic challenges, and changing investment climate. This trend has to be drastically reversed, and rather invigorate multifaceted relations. As practical matter of facts, Russia’s decision would be in the right direction in connection with allocating financial resources for specific projects by setting up a Development Fund under the African Partnership Department at Russia’s Foreign Ministry. This ultimate step offers possibility to gain the status as a recognizable key player in the continent. And in this case, Russia’s investment partnerships and its dominating economic collaborations would become more visible in future across Africa.
