By Ajong Mbapndah L *
Somalia stands at another defining moment in its long and often turbulent journey toward stability, democracy, and national renewal. With debates intensifying over constitutional reforms, federalism, security, and the country’s electoral future, attention is increasingly turning to the leaders seeking to chart Somalia’s next chapter.
Among the latest entrants into the presidential race is veteran politician, academic, and institution builder Abdulkareem Hassan Jama, whose candidacy is already generating significant interest across the political landscape. Widely regarded as one of Somalia’s most experienced public policy voices, Jama enters the contest with a career that spans government service, academia, research, and nation-building.
A former Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, Chief of Staff, and senior presidential adviser, Jama has played influential roles in shaping public policy and governance during some of Somalia’s most critical periods of state reconstruction. Beyond government, he is a founding member of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS), Somalia’s leading independent think tank, and the executive founder of one of Mogadishu’s foremost universities, earning recognition as a champion of knowledge-driven leadership and institutional development.
Hailing from Somalia’s northern regions but with deep personal, professional, and political ties across the country, Jama has cultivated a broad coalition of supporters that cuts across regional, political, and social divides. His supporters view him as a bridge-builder capable of fostering dialogue and consensus in a nation where political fragmentation has often undermined progress.
As Somalia prepares for another crucial political transition, Jama is presenting himself as a candidate focused on strengthening institutions, restoring trust in governance, creating economic opportunities for the country’s youthful population, and steering Somalia away from perpetual political crisis toward lasting stability and national confidence.
In this exclusive interview with Pan African Visions, Abdulkareem Hassan Jama discusses his vision for Somalia, the challenges facing the country, the future of federalism, the fight against Al-Shabaab, youth empowerment, electoral reforms, and the kind of legacy he hopes to leave should Somalis entrust him with the nation’s highest office.
What is your assessment of the decision to postpone elections, and how can Somalia restore confidence in the democratic process?
The postponement of elections is a reflection of the broader political and institutional challenges Somalia continues to face. When delays occur repeatedly as has occurred in the past, citizens begin to feel the uncertainty of the electoral process and may question the credibility of the political leadership itself.
As Somalia is still confronting serious security threats, political disagreements between federal and state leaders, institutional weaknesses, and unresolved constitutional questions. But these realities should not be used as an excuse for election delays which could erode public confidence or lead to instability. The Somali people deserve certainty, transparency, and a credible path forward.
To restore confidence in the democratic process, several things must happen immediately.
First, there must be an inclusive national political agreement involving the Federal Government, Federal Member States, opposition groups, civil society, women, youth, and traditional elders. No election process can succeed if major stakeholders feel excluded. Somalia’s progress has always depended on dialogue and consensus.
Second, we need a clear and public electoral roadmap with fixed timelines and responsibilities. Somali citizens should know exactly what milestones must be completed, by whom, and when. Transparency builds trust.
Third, the electoral institutions must be genuinely independent and professional. The public must believe that electoral bodies serve the nation, not political interests. That means strengthening oversight, improving technical capacity, and ensuring fairness in the management of the process.
Finally, leaders must change the political culture itself. Somalia cannot continue operating through short-term political calculations and endless disputes over power-sharing. We must move toward a politics based on national interest, constitutional order, accountability, and service to the people.
I believe Somalis are ready for democratic progress. Our people are politically aware, resilient, entrepreneurial, and deeply patriotic. What they are asking for is not perfection — they are asking for honesty, fairness, and leadership that puts the country above personal ambition.
If we restore trust, uphold agreements, and place national unity first, Somalia can still build a democratic system that reflects the dignity and aspirations of its people.
Recent clashes have raised concerns about stability. What do these incidents reveal about Somalia’s current challenges, and how would you address them?
The recent clashes are a painful reminder that Somalia is still in a fragile transition. They reveal two major challenges we must confront honestly.
First, our political disagreements too often escalate because institutions remain weak and trust between stakeholders is limited. When leaders fail to resolve disputes through dialogue and constitutional processes, tensions can quickly spill into violence.
Second, Somalia still faces unfinished state-building. We have made progress, but the relationship between the federal government, federal member states, opposition groups and security institutions remains unclear and sometimes contested. Stability cannot exist where governance is inconsistent or exclusion is perceived.
My approach would be based on three priorities.
First, I would pursue genuine political reconciliation. Somalia cannot move forward through winner-takes-all politics. We need regular national dialogue between federal leaders, regional states, opposition groups, traditional elders, business leaders, women, and youth to resolve disputes before they become crises.
Second, I would convene a fully representative national conference for all stakeholders to create consensus on finalizing the constitution including clear delineation of powers and resource sharing in the federal system. I would also ensure the creation of a competent constitutional court to address disputes as well as a highly a representative and independent electoral commission.
Third, I would focus heavily on security sector reform. Our soldiers and police must serve the nation, not political interests or clan divisions. That means professional training, reliable salaries, unified command structures, and stronger intelligence coordination against terrorism and armed violence.
Despite these challenges, I remain hopeful because Somalis themselves are resilient, entrepreneurial, and deeply committed to rebuilding their country. The answer to instability is not fear or division — it is stronger institutions, inclusive leadership, justice, and opportunity for all Somalis.
Somalia remains deeply divided along political, regional, and clan lines. What makes you believe you can succeed where previous administrations have struggled to build lasting national unity?
Somalia is divided, but I do not believe Somalia is naturally doomed to division. What unites Somalis remains deeper than what divides us: faith, language, culture, trade, family networks, and a shared desire for peace, dignity, and a functioning state. The problem is not that Somalis cannot live together.
Ordinary Somalis cooperate and the business community not only collaborate but thrive every day across regions and communities. The problem is that politics has too often amplified division instead of managing it responsibly. Somalia has chosen a federal system, and disagreements between the center and regions are normal in any federal country. The danger comes when those disagreements are not managed through credible institutions, constitutional clarity, and trusted leadership.
That is why I would prioritize an inclusive constitutional settlement and the establishment of a credible Constitutional Court. Somalia needs institutions that can settle disputes fairly, so that every disagreement does not become a clan crisis, regional crisis, or national confrontation. My belief in unity comes from Somali society itself. Our people already trade, invest, marry, study, and support each other across political lines. The spirit of unity exists. Politics must stop damaging it. Somalia does not need a leader who uses division to gain power; it needs leadership that turns our diversity into a functioning national strength.
Critics say Somalia’s political elite recycle the same promises every election cycle. Why should Somalis trust that your candidacy represents genuine change rather than continuity?
Somalis have every right to be skeptical. They have heard promises about security, reconciliation, democracy, anti-corruption, and development for many years. Too often, what followed was political paralysis, elite competition, weak institutions, and disappointment. So I do not ask Somalis to trust me blindly. Citizens should judge every candidate — including me — by their record, conduct, competence, consistency, and seriousness.
Somali citizens are tired of slogans; they want seriousness, competence, integrity, and results. What makes my candidacy different is not a promise of miracles. What is different is the governing philosophy behind this candidacy. For too long, Somali politics has been dominated by short-term survival: temporary alliances, clan calculations, political engineering, and competition for power. Meanwhile, citizens continue to face insecurity, unemployment, weak services, and uncertainty.
I believe Somalia must move from survival politics to state-building. Leadership must become performance-based, not personality-based. Real change is not simply replacing one politician with another. Real change is changing the culture of governance itself — from personalization to institutions, from confrontation to cooperation, and from political survival to national development. My record of inclusive institution building both in government and in the private sector speaks for itself.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s push for a transition toward universal suffrage has sparked intense debate. Do you support the move, and how would you ensure electoral reforms are inclusive and constitutional?
We must separate two questions. The first is whether Somalia should ultimately move toward one-person, one-vote elections. My answer is yes. Every Somali citizen deserves the right to directly choose their leaders. The second question is how that transition should happen. It cannot be imposed unilaterally, outside broad political consensus and constitutional agreement.
Somalia’s challenge today is not disagreement over the principle of democratic participation. The challenge is legitimacy, mandates, constitutional process, trust, and national consensus. For more than two decades, Somalia has struggled to build the security, institutional and administrative foundations for credible nationwide elections. That is why previous indirect systems, however imperfect, were accepted: they were negotiated political arrangements among key stakeholders.
Electoral reform cannot succeed if it is seen as unilateral, exclusionary, or designed to predetermine outcomes. Democracy is not just announcing elections. It is public confidence in the fairness and legitimacy of the process. Somalia’s stakeholders must urgently negotiate a consensual path forward. That could mean an agreed framework toward universal suffrage, or a credible indirect model accepted by the Federal Government, Federal Member States, opposition groups, and other national stakeholders.
My position is clear: I support universal suffrage, but I also support constitutionalism, consensus, inclusion, and political realism. Somalia needs elections that unite the country, not a process that deepens mistrust.
Security remains Somalia’s greatest challenge, particularly the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. What would be different about your strategy to restore stability and strengthen state authority?
Al-Shabaab remains Somalia’s most immediate security threat. ISIS elements, criminal networks, arms trafficking, and external pressures also threaten national stability. But one of Somalia’s greatest vulnerabilities is internal political fragmentation. A divided political class weakens the state and creates openings for extremists and hostile actors.
My security strategy would begin with national cohesion around the security mission of the state. For too long, security has been treated through narrow political calculations rather than long-term institution-building. Somalia cannot defeat an insurgency sustainably if security institutions are politicized, fragmented, or treated as tools of political survival. We must build a professional Somali National Army, police, intelligence service, and security leadership based on competence, merit, discipline, and national loyalty.
Soldiers must be trained, equipped, paid reliably, and respected. But military force alone is not enough. Somalia has liberated areas before, only to lose ground because stabilization did not follow. A town is not liberated when fighters leave; it is liberated when the state can protect and serve its people. I would establish a permanent peace and reconciliation mechanism involving respected religious scholars, community leaders, mediation experts, and pathways for those willing to abandon violence. The state must maintain pressure against those who attack civilians and reject peace. But lasting security requires good governance, trust, justice and employment for the youth.
You have served in senior government roles and advised past administrations. Looking back, what do you believe were the biggest mistakes Somalia’s political leadership made over the last decade?
The biggest mistake was that Somali leaders spent too much time competing for control of the state before fully building the state itself. Too often, politics was dominated by short-term survival, tactical alliances, elite rivalries, and electoral maneuvering, while deeper structural challenges remained unresolved. I say this not as someone standing outside the system, but as someone who served within government and saw both the progress made and the opportunities lost.
One major failure was the lack of sustainable national consensus. In a complex federal and clan-based society, unilateralism and exclusion always produce crisis. A second mistake was allowing personalities to become stronger than institutions. When institutions are weak, every disagreement becomes existential. A third failure was not completing the constitutional settlement. Somalia cannot achieve long-term stability while questions of federalism, elections, powers, and resource-sharing remain unresolved.
On security, we too often treated Al-Shabaab as only a military problem. Territory was liberated, but governance, justice, reconciliation, and services did not always follow. Still, Somalia today is not the Somalia of 2009. Institutions were rebuilt, debt relief advanced, businesses grew, universities expanded, and security capacity improved. The next phase must consolidate those gains by successive governments. Somalia can no longer afford politics centered on managing power; it must build institutions that outlast individuals.
Somalia’s youth make up the majority of the population, yet unemployment and migration pressures remain severe. What concrete economic vision do you have to create jobs and restore hope for young Somalis?
Somalia’s youth are its greatest strength, but too many have grown up seeing migration as more realistic than opportunity at home. That must change. My economic vision is to move Somalia from a survival economy to a productive economy — one that creates jobs through investment, infrastructure, skills, enterprise, and national production.
We must begin with sectors where Somalia already has natural advantages: livestock, agriculture, fisheries, renewable energy, ports, logistics, construction, digital services, and trade. These sectors can employ large numbers of young people if properly supported. I would launch a national youth skills and employment initiative focused on technical and vocational training. Somalia needs electricians, mechanics, fisheries technicians, agricultural specialists, construction workers, ICT professionals, logistics managers, and food-processing workers. Too many jobs are filled by imported skilled labor because we have not trained our own youth properly.
We must also support entrepreneurship through access to finance, business training, incubators, tax incentives, and public-private partnerships. Education must also change. Universities should include practical training, internships, technical skills, and research linked to the economy. Finally, Somalia must attract investment by improving security, fighting corruption, protecting property rights, and creating a predictable business environment. Our youth do not lack talent; they lack a state that organizes opportunity around them.
Your supporters describe you as a bridge between northern and southern Somalia. How do you intend to navigate tensions between the Federal Government and regional states, especially Somaliland and Puntland?
My background gives me a useful perspective. I come from the Northeastern federal state of the former British Somaliland protectorate, grew up and was educated in southern Somalia, and politically my constituency also intersects with Puntland federal state through Somalia’s current power-sharing arrangements. But Somalia’s future cannot depend on one individual acting as a bridge. We need institutions and political habits that sustain trust across all regions.
Relations between the Federal Government Federal member state administrations have too often become personalized, politicized, and crisis-driven. We need permanent mechanisms for consultation on security, revenue-sharing, elections, constitutional implementation, development, and dispute resolution. Federalism should not be treated as a temporary political bargain. It must become a functioning system of shared governance that protects both national unity and regional interests.
Regarding Somaliland, the issue requires patience, realism, wisdom, and statesmanship. Emotional rhetoric will not solve it. I would prioritize sustained dialogue, confidence-building measures, economic cooperation, people-to-people engagement, and respectful communication. Economic integration can become a powerful bridge. Trade, ports, livestock, fisheries, infrastructure, aviation, and investment create shared interests and reduce hostility over time.
No region should feel targeted, excluded, or marginalized. Mogadishu cannot succeed without the federal member states. Federal member states cannot prosper without a functioning national government. No region can stabilize alone. Trust is built through conduct, appointments, development priorities, resource allocation, and fairness. Somalia’s unity will not be restored by slogans; it will be rebuilt through trust, fairness, and shared interests.
Corruption and weak institutions continue to undermine public trust. What specific reforms would you implement in your first 100 days to improve accountability and governance?
Restoring public trust must begin immediately. My first 100 days would focus on visible reforms that show a clear change in direction. First, I would launch a government-wide accountability and financial transparency initiative. Ministries and major public institutions would undergo expenditure reviews, payroll verification, and procurement audits to identify ghost workers, duplicate payments, and irregular contracts. Second, I would accelerate digitization of public finance. Electronic salary payments, digital procurement systems, customs modernization, and transparent revenue collection reduce corruption by reducing discretion and secrecy.
Third, I would enforce merit-based appointments in critical institutions — especially finance, customs, auditing, security management, and public administration. A capable state cannot be built on nepotism or favoritism. Fourth, I would strengthen oversight institutions, including the Auditor General, anti-corruption bodies, parliamentary committees, financial reporting institutions, and judicial accountability mechanisms.
Fifth, major public contracts and procurement decisions should be published where national security does not prevent it. Citizens have the right to know how public money is spent. I would also prioritize security sector accountability. Soldiers and police must be paid reliably, procurement must be audited, and abuses against civilians must be investigated. Accountability is not only punishment. It is a culture of public service. Public office must return to being a responsibility, not a route to personal enrichment.
Somalia’s international partners remain heavily involved in security, aid, and state-building. How would your administration balance foreign partnerships while protecting Somalia’s sovereignty and national interests?
Somalia needs international partners, but Somalia must not remain permanently dependent on them. The goal is not isolation. The goal is mature partnership: Somalia leads, partners support, and national interests come first. My approach would rest on five principles. First, Somali ownership. Security, aid, investment, and development programs must align with a national strategy defined by Somalia. Second, transparency. Major agreements involving security, ports, infrastructure, natural resources, fisheries, or strategic assets must pass through proper legal and institutional channels.
Third, capacity-building, not dependency. International support should strengthen Somali institutions so that, over time, we need less external operational support. Fourth, balanced diplomacy. Somalia should maintain constructive relations with African, Arab, Islamic, Western, and Asian partners without becoming a proxy battlefield for competing interests. Fifth, mutual accountability. Somali officials must use foreign assistance responsibly, and partners must respect Somalia’s laws, sovereignty, and institutions.
In security, international support remains important, but the end goal must be a Somali security sector capable of protecting the country. In development, aid must increasingly shift toward jobs, infrastructure, agriculture, fisheries, energy, education, and revenue generation. Somalia welcomes partnership, but not patronage; cooperation, but not dependency.
If elected president, what do you want your legacy to be — and what would success look like for Somalia at the end of your first term?
If entrusted with leadership, I would want my legacy to be that Somalia moved from permanent transition toward lasting stability and institutional maturity. Somalia has lived too long in cycles of political crisis, temporary arrangements, insecurity, and unfinished state-building. My goal would be to help Somalia become a more normal, functioning, secure, and confident state.
Success would mean the country is clearly moving in the right direction. I would want Somalis to feel safer — with stronger security forces, reduced Al-Shabaab capacity, expanded state presence, better policing, and greater freedom to travel, trade, study, and work. I would want politics to become less crisis-driven — with better federal relations, constitutional progress, credible electoral arrangements, stronger institutions, and peaceful competition.
I would want young Somalis to believe their future can be built at home — through jobs, skills, investment, agriculture, fisheries, livestock, energy, technology, and entrepreneurship. I would want corruption reduced and public trust strengthened. A state earns legitimacy through fairness, competence, and delivery, not speeches. Above all, I would want to restore national belief. I want the next generation to inherit a Somalia where institutions matter more than individuals, and hope is stronger than fear.
Many people associate Somalia with conflict and instability. What would you tell them about the country’s opportunities and potential, and what gives you hope—and concern—about Somalia’s future?
The question is no longer whether Somalia has potential. The real question is whether we will have the leadership, unity, and discipline to unlock it.
I believe we can. And I believe the next chapter of Somalia should not be defined by conflict, but by recovery, dignity, productivity, and national renewal.
Many people associate Somalia with conflict and instability, but Somalia is far more than the negative headlines. Our country has enormous potential: the longest coastline in mainland Africa, rich natural resources, a strategic location for global trade, and one of the most entrepreneurial populations on the continent.
What gives me hope is the resilience and energy of the Somali people—especially our youth, entrepreneurs, women, and diaspora. Even in difficult circumstances, Somalis continue to build businesses, support communities, and push for a better future.
At the same time, I am concerned about political division, insecurity, youth unemployment, and climate challenges. If we fail to build strong institutions and national unity, we risk delaying Somalia’s progress.
But I remain optimistic. Somalia has survived immense hardship, and that proves the strength of our people. With good leadership, unity, and investment in our youth and economy, Somalia can become a more stable, more prosperous, and respected nation.
*Culled from June Edition of PAV Magazine
