By Minga Mbweck Kongo*
On January 20, 2024, thousands of Congolese marched and danced acrobatically to the tune of rumba with surging energy and confidence at the Stade des Martyrs de Kinshasa to witness the swearing-in of president Tshisekedi for his second term. “I solemnly swear… to defend the constitution and the laws of the Republic… to maintain its independence and the integrity of its territory,” Tshisekedi, declared during the inauguration ceremony, conducted before the members of the constitutional court and in the presence of several African Heads of State and numerous diplomats from around the world.
One of the most compelling outcomes of the 2023 Congolese elections is the notion that the people’s choice actively and decisively contributes to shaping a new political trajectory for Congo. “I am taking back the baton of command that you entrusted to me. We want a more united, stronger and prosperous Congo,” Declared President Tshisekedi. Far from merely confirming what is already known, the act of choosing someone the population favours become integral to the process of national constitution. This is particularly significant in a society still grappling with the enduring impact of an extended incursion by Rwanda and facing the unspoken genocide record highlighted in the UN mapping report. To cast a vote and make a choice is to gain knowledge—but always in specific ways. Also to cast a vote and to choose is to know—but always to know in particular ways.
“I am cognisant of your expectations,” he affirmed. In his inauguration address, Tshisekedi outlined his vision for the second five-year emphasising six key objectives: enhancing security, fostering job creation, stabilising inflation, diversifying the economy, ensuring broader access to basic services and bolstering the efficiency of the public services. Reflecting on the wealth of Congo, Tshisekedi underscored that the security and prosperity of Congolese development would make a substantial contribution to global development.
Threat and vulnerability
The invasion of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been shaped by two pivotal events—the ousting of former president Mobutu by a coalition of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and a few Congolese dissidents led by Lauren Desire Kabila, and the subsequent assassination of Kabila. These events remain crucial for understanding the internal sources of insecurity as they shattered the perception of Congo’s immunity from Rwanda’s invasion, lending credence to Congo as a soft security target. This perspective argues the entire country is a victim of international forces exploiting its mineral resources. In his speeches, Tshisekedi has consistently contends that the conflict in DRC is not of the country’s own making but is a war into which it is being drawn by Rwanda with the backing of multinationals, without reasonable cause or sound reason.
The recent UN report highlights the presence of the Rwandan army on DRC soil and argues that the perspective of the DRC is of the breeding ground for multinationals interests.
The argument presented here is that Rwanda’s invasion of the DRC with its rebel group M23 has two faces: the face of governance and the face of security. The two faces of invasion are closely associated because security is defined as effective order and control. It is the foundation of governance, promoting participation and accountability. Fragile and dysfunctional security institutions have made the DRC vulnerable and a soft target for invasion since the 90s. It is a security challenge where lax internal security and porous borders foster conditions that M23 rebel groups, supported by Rwanda, exploit. Tshisekedi suggests that building realistic strategies to counter Rwanda’s invasion revolves around reforming security institutions, particularly the army.
Governance, security, and a challenging time ahead
The creation of the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” was made official in Nairobi a few days before the DRC election on. At the helm is the self-proclaimed colonel Corneille Nangaa, the former president of the Electoral Commission, who has now assumed the role of a rebel leader.
The decline in security institutions responsible for order and control falls within the broader category of state weakness, a prominent characterisation of the DRC’s vulnerabilities or failures, sometimes described in abstract terms. Examining rebel activity in the eastern part of the country, prompts questions about the state and quality of policing and law enforcement. When politicians, police and the security forces turn protective weapons into tools of criminality by participating in armed robberies, betrayal and all manner of criminal activities, it raises crucial questions about the quality of protective institutions.
Moreover, when numerous army generals have small militia groups to protect their business interests in the country’s eastern region, it signifies the deterioration of essential control systems central to the protection of sovereignty. The DRC, in its current state, speaks to the absence of effective law enforcement structures and weak or non-existent immigration policies that have all colluded to render the country a weak link in the war on rebellion. President Tshisekedi has promptly formed partnerships with external actors. Mobilising international resources from the global community to fund the capacity needed for combating armed groups and corruption is relatively feasible.
The disgruntled Nangaa’s professed aim is to save the DRC from the chronic instability that has prevailed for three decades. However, his strategies for achieving this are rooted in the Rwando-Ugandan ideology. The mobilising and unifying ideas of the (March 23 Movement (M23), and its leaders, are connected to Kagame.
Despite all the contradictions arising from the war, it is not too late for the outcomes, President Tshisekedi is striving for through his diplomatic efforts, to end the insecurity. He has promised “a profound restructuring of our security and defence apparatus” and is engaging further diplomatic initiates to address the security crisis in eastern provinces.
* Minga Kongo is an anthropologist, development scholar with research interests in water sociality, mobility, urbanism, politics, illness and climate change. He is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Institute for Humanities in Africa (HUMA) at the University of Cape Town.He can be reached via email kongmbweck@gmail.com
