By Edwin Austin
At a conference hall in Addis Ababa in August 2026, the head of the Eastern Africa Power Pool admitted what the region’s utilities have felt for years. “The Eastern Africa Power Pool market has not yet properly started; we are currently in a dispute,” Ashebir Balcha said. Meanwhile, 3,800 kilometres to the west, a different power pool (WAPP) completed its first synchronisation trial, sending uninterrupted electricity flows across twelve West African countries. Two power pools, two decades of promises. One has learned to pool its electrons. The other is still learning to pool its politics.
My dearest reader, this is a story about two continental megaprojects, one working grid and one stuck in a boardroom dispute. What East Africa can learn from ECOWAS, and what Aliko Dangote’s Lamu refinery reveals about which direction the continent’s industrial current is flowing.
The West African Power Pool (WAPP) is the flagship energy programme of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). By mid-2026, more than 4,000 kilometres of high-voltage transmission lines had connected the electricity systems of 15 West African countries, allowing roughly 8 percent of the region’s power to be traded across borders, close to the European Commission’s 10 to 12 percent benchmark for cross-border trade.

A World Bank results brief credits the programme with electricity access for more than three million people in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone and The Gambia between 2019 and 2025 .
Compare that with the Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP), which was born even earlier, in 2005. It is still stuck at the starting line of its own market. Its Day-Ahead Market platform has been designed, tested and staffed with trained traders, yet formal trading has not begun. Regional power trade in East Africa remains modest, at roughly 3,500 gigawatt-hours a year, about 1.3 percent of the region’s total consumption. West Africa is already near 8 percent.
The grid West Africa built
The contrast is sharpest in the projects themselves. West Africa’s Côte d’Ivoire–Liberia–Sierra Leone–Guinea (CLSG) interconnector, 1,303 kilometres of 225 kV line, began commercial operations in December 2021 and is now exporting Ivorian power to Guinea and Sierra Leone, the first reliable cross-border flows those corridors have ever seen .
The 875-kilometre North Core line, which will link Nigeria to Burkina Faso through Niger and Benin, stood at 56 percent physical completion at the end of 2025 and is designed to cut wholesale electricity costs by up to 40 percent in landlocked states that historically pay some of Africa’s highest tariffs.
Progress has not been friction-free. “While steady progress has been recorded, security challenges and logistical constraints in parts of the region continue to delay timelines and raise costs,” WAPP Secretary General Abdoulaye Dia’s office acknowledged at the project’s April 2026 Joint Supervision Committee meeting in Abuja. But the trajectory is unmistakable: in late 2025, WAPP completed its first synchronisation trial, sending uninterrupted power flows across twelve countries, and a regional Day-Ahead Market is being launched in 2026 with validated tariffs.

ECOWAS has also attacked the problem from the other end: the households the grid cannot yet reach. Its $338.7 million Regional Off-Grid Electricity Access Project (ROGEAP), financed by the World Bank, the Clean Technology Fund and the Netherlands, is building a regional market for stand-alone solar across 19 West and Sahelian countries, with a $140 million credit line for private solar businesses and grants targeting women and young entrepreneurs. It is regional integration not just in steel towers but in business registries and quality standards.
And the energy grid sits inside a wider infrastructure play: the 1,028-kilometre Lagos–Abidjan corridor highway, valued at nearly $15 billion, part of a 25-year ECOWAS master plan spanning 201 regional projects worth an estimated $131 billion. For the region’s 400 million citizens, the message from Abuja is that power, roads and trade are one project, not three.
East Africa’s paradox: world-class lines, stuck market
East Africa is not standing still, and its physical assets are impressive. The 500 kV Ethiopia–Kenya HVDC line, 1,067 kilometres, commissioned in 2022, is among Africa’s most modern; Ethiopia is now preparing to double its exports to Kenya from 200 to 400 megawatts. The Kenya–Tanzania 400 kV line was energised in 2024 and launched for trade in early 2025. In June 2026, the World Bank approved a $1.6 billion, ten-year programme, RETRADE-EA, to accelerate exactly the kind of integration ECOWAS has spent fifteen years building.
The gap is institutional, not physical. Where ECOWAS and its regulator ERERA validated market tariffs and synchronised grids, East Africa’s market operator fight has consumed years. Where WAPP is launching its Day-Ahead Market this year, the EAPP is “assuming pending issues will be addressed on time” before it can do the same. The lesson East African policymakers rarely say out loud: the hard part of a power pool is not the pylons. It is the willingness of thirteen governments to submit to common rules.

Dangote’s compass points west, then east
If the grids tell one story about integration, capital tells another. When Africa’s richest man decided to expand refining beyond Nigeria, he had options across the continent. He chose Lamu, off Kenya’s Indian Ocean coast, for a $16 billion, 700,000-barrel-per-day refinery and petrochemical complex, East Africa’s largest refining project and Kenya’s biggest-ever foreign direct investment. Ground was broken on September 30, 2026, with completion promised in 40 months and 30 percent of the equity offered to East African governments.
“Kenya is one because, by the time we finish investing here, just this refinery alone is $16 billion, and it’s the largest investment that an African invested in Africa,” Aliko Dangote said at the groundbreaking. His vice president for oil and gas, Edwin Devakumar, had been blunter months earlier: “The site has been selected, soil tests are under way, and design and engineering work has commenced. Kenya was the choice from the beginning”
The choice is revealing in both directions. It is a West African industrialist replicating, in East Africa, the $20 billion Lekki refinery that transformed Nigeria from fuel importer to net exporter of refined products. Kenya’s presidential economic adviser, David Ndii, framed the regional stakes: “He has offered us and other East African countries 30 percent investment, so we are taking up ours,” naming Kenya, Ethiopia and Rwanda as expected participants, with Kenya’s share valued around $500 million. Kenyan President William Ruto called the project a “generational undertaking” projected to add 12 percent to Kenya’s GDP and create some 60,000 direct and indirect jobs.
But note what Dangote is not betting on: a functioning East African energy market. A refinery needs stable fuel economics, ports and pipelines, not necessarily a synchronised regional grid, and East Africa’s power pool currently offers few of the trading certainty West Africa has legislated into existence. The investment follows the market-ready region for industry; the region that has built institutions gets the integrated grid. East Africa is currently getting Dangote’s capital, but it has yet to prove it can do what ECOWAS did with its own neighbours’ electrons.

What ECOWAS got right, and what Nairobi should steal
Three transferable lessons emerge. First, sequence institutions before infrastructure: ECOWAS built ERERA, a grid code and standard contracts while lines were still under construction, so when the steel was ready, the market was too. Second, integrate the informal economy into the plan: ROGEAP treats solar entrepreneurs, women and youth as part of the energy system, not afterthoughts. Third, tie energy to a visible flagship: the Lagos–Abidjan corridor gives ECOWAS integration a road people can drive. East Africa’s equivalent, the Lamu refinery, arrived from outside the region’s institutions rather than through them.
The 40-month clock on Dangote’s Lamu refinery is now running, with completion promised in 2030. By then, the World Bank-backed RETRADE-EA programme is meant to have moved East Africa from bilateral deals to a functioning regional electricity market. Whether it does will depend on the same test ECOWAS passed and the EAPP is still failing: whether thirteen governments can submit to common rules, appoint a market operator and mean it.
Suffice it to say, in the race to light up two Africas, one region has learned to pool its power. The other is still learning to pool its politics. ECOWAS, fifty years after its founding, has made its choice clear. The question for East Africa’s policymakers is whether the current keeps flowing their way.