Backed by Senegal after a remarkable reconciliation with President Bassirou Diomaye Faye and formally nominated by Burundi on March 2, 2026, the former Senegalese president is campaigning on UN reform, preventive diplomacy, development and rebuilding trust in multilateralism
By Ajong Mbapndah L
Macky Sall is asking the world to look beyond the turbulence that marked the closing chapter of his presidency and judge him instead by the breadth of his international experience, his years navigating some of Africa’s biggest diplomatic challenges and a vision he says could help restore confidence in a United Nations struggling with wars, financial pressures, geopolitical rivalry and declining faith in multilateral institutions. The former Senegalese president’s campaign to succeed António Guterres has evolved from an initially awkward nomination without the immediate formal backing of his own country into a serious diplomatic operation built around one central proposition: the UN must change if it is to remain relevant.
Sall formally entered the contest on March 2, 2026, when Burundi transmitted his nomination to the President of the UN General Assembly and the President of the Security Council. The date is important because it marked the transformation of months of speculation about his international ambitions into an official candidacy for one of the most consequential diplomatic positions in the world. Burundi’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Zéphyrin Maniratanga, wrote that his government, which held the rotating chairmanship of the African Union, was nominating the former Senegalese leader for the position of Secretary-General.
The wording deserves attention. “My Government, current Chair of the African Union, nominates the former President of the Republic of Senegal, Macky Sall, for the position of Secretary-General,” Maniratanga wrote in the March 2 letter. The nomination therefore came formally from Burundi at a moment when President Évariste Ndayishimiye was serving as chair of the African Union Assembly. It gave Sall powerful continental symbolism, although the Burundi nomination should not be confused with a formal collective endorsement agreed by all AU member states.
That distinction has become more consequential as the campaign has progressed. Sall is presenting himself not simply as a former Senegalese president seeking another international position but as an African statesman carrying many of the grievances and reform demands the continent has articulated for decades. His campaign slogan, “Africa at its heart, the world in its sights,” neatly captures that balancing act: African enough to make representation and reform central to his case, but sufficiently internationalist to convince governments that he would lead the UN as an impartial servant of all 193 member states.
His formal vision, titled “Rebuilding Multilateralism for a Better World,” begins from a bleak diagnosis of the international system. Sall argues that protracted conflicts, new security threats, economic uncertainty and the debt burden confronting developing countries are occurring just as confidence in the institutions created to manage global problems is weakening. Yet his conclusion is not that multilateralism has failed beyond repair.
“Even amid such great uncertainty, I am convinced that this global organization continues to be an indispensable universal platform for dialogue and collective action on joint solutions to our shared challenges,” Sall says in the vision statement submitted with his candidacy.
That conviction sits at the centre of his campaign. Sall is not proposing to dismantle the post-1945 international architecture; he wants to reform it sufficiently to restore its legitimacy. His diagnosis is that the principles of the UN Charter remain relevant while the structures and practices through which they are implemented have failed to keep pace with a transformed world. The challenge, as his campaign presents it, is therefore to preserve multilateralism by changing how it works.
“More than ever, a reinvented multilateralism remains the best way to respond to the challenges of a world in full transformation,” Sall has argued, a phrase that captures the philosophical foundation of his candidacy.
The vision rests broadly on three pillars. Sall sees peace, security and development as inseparable; he wants global governance institutions, particularly the Security Council and international financial architecture, reformed to better reflect contemporary realities; and he advocates a leaner, more accountable United Nations capable of demonstrating that the money entrusted to it produces tangible results.
This last point has featured prominently as Sall courts governments increasingly concerned about UN costs and effectiveness. His campaign argues for streamlining structures, simplifying mandates, improving management and reducing unnecessary duplication. Sall says he wants a United Nations “that delivers results governments can defend before their citizens.”
It is a message calculated to resonate well beyond Africa. Developing countries want greater representation and more equitable access to financing, while major contributors increasingly demand evidence that the UN uses resources efficiently. Sall is trying to occupy the space between those constituencies: reform the power structures that disadvantage developing countries while reforming the bureaucracy that frustrates governments financing the institution.
His performance during the July 23 UN Town Hall brought those arguments before one of the campaign’s most important public audiences. In the General Assembly Hall, candidates seeking to succeed Guterres faced questions about conflicts, institutional credibility, reform and the role of the Secretary-General. Sall returned repeatedly to the question of trust and to his belief that the United Nations must become more effective at preventing crises rather than merely managing their consequences.
He was particularly direct about the marginalisation of the UN in some of the major crises confronting the world.
“There are many different crises and the UN is not at the heart of negotiations on them. Sometimes the organization is on the sidelines,” Sall told the Town Hall. “We need more than ever a Security Council that functions in line with the provisions of the UN Charter.”
That is a revealing formulation because it goes to the heart of Sall’s argument. A United Nations that is absent when major powers negotiate the gravest international crises risks becoming an observer of events it was created to influence. For Sall, restoring relevance requires a Secretary-General willing to use diplomacy proactively while encouraging the Security Council to assume the responsibilities assigned to it by the Charter.
His campaign has consequently placed preventive diplomacy high on the agenda. Rather than waiting until wars produce humanitarian catastrophes and displacement, Sall argues that the UN should invest greater political energy in mediation before crises become unmanageable. The next Secretary-General, in his conception, must be an active diplomatic operator rather than simply the administrator of an enormous international bureaucracy.
That philosophy draws heavily on Sall’s experience as president of Senegal from 2012 to 2024 and as African Union chair in 2022. His supporters point to a résumé that includes participation in major international summits, engagement with leaders across geopolitical divides and advocacy on questions ranging from African representation in global institutions to food security, debt and development financing.
During his AU chairmanship, Sall was among the most forceful advocates for the African Union to become a permanent member of the G20, a goal achieved in 2023. When Russia’s invasion of Ukraine disrupted grain and fertilizer supplies, he travelled to Sochi in June 2022 to discuss Africa’s concerns with Russian President Vladimir Putin. He also repeatedly championed the reallocation of Special Drawing Rights and reform of the international financial architecture to give developing countries greater fiscal space. His campaign now presents those interventions as evidence that he can speak across geopolitical divides while placing developing-country concerns on the global agenda.
Africa occupies a particularly important place in Sall’s argument. During a campaign visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo, he described his candidacy as driven in part by the desire to carry “the strong voice of Africa in the concert of nations.” He coupled that aspiration with support for a more equitable international partnership and development financing system.
The message is particularly potent on UN Security Council reform. Africa has 54 UN member states but no permanent seat on the Security Council. Sall argues that an institution whose most powerful body still reflects the geopolitical settlement of 1945 cannot indefinitely claim adequate representation of today’s international community. Reform, from this perspective, is not simply an African demand but a question of the UN’s legitimacy.
His African credentials, however, cannot by themselves win the election. The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council, which means any successful candidate must navigate the interests of the five permanent members — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — while building sufficient support among the Council’s elected members.
Sall has therefore been campaigning intensively beyond Africa. His diplomatic consultations have included engagement with governments and senior officials across Europe, Asia, Africa and the major powers. His meetings have included French President Emmanuel Macron, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, among others, while his campaign has sought to sell the same basic proposition in different capitals: reform does not mean destroying the United Nations but making it credible enough to survive an increasingly fractured international environment.
Yet perhaps the most politically significant meeting of Sall’s campaign took place not in Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Paris or New York, but in Dakar on July 17.
There, Sall met President Bassirou Diomaye Faye, his successor and the political beneficiary of one of the most turbulent periods of Sall’s presidency. Sall described the visit as part of the consultations connected to his UN candidacy. The symbolism was difficult to miss: the former president was asking for the backing of a government led by men who had been among his fiercest political opponents.
Only three days later, on July 20, Faye’s government made its decision public. President Faye instructed the government and Senegal’s diplomatic network to “fully mobilize” behind Sall, declaring that his bid “is now Senegal’s candidacy in the service of Africa.”
It was an extraordinary gesture considering the history between the two political camps. Faye rose to power from an opposition movement that had fiercely challenged Sall’s government. Sall’s unsuccessful attempt to postpone the February 2024 presidential election triggered a constitutional and political crisis before the Constitutional Council intervened, and the period surrounding the transition was scarred by protests, arrests and bitter accusations. Faye’s administration has subsequently criticised aspects of Sall’s record, including the handling of public finances, allegations the former president rejects.
The July meeting therefore carried a reconciliatory quality that went well beyond Sall’s personal campaign. Whatever disagreements remained between them, Faye effectively separated domestic political disputes from what his government considered a larger Senegalese and African interest. For Sall, campaigning internationally as an advocate of dialogue and consensus, the image of a former president and his once-hostile successor finding common ground could hardly have been more useful.
There is nevertheless an unavoidable irony in Sall presenting himself as a global reconciler after leaving office amid such domestic polarisation. Critics will ask whether the political turbulence of his final years is compatible with the preventive diplomacy he now champions. Supporters will counter that Senegal’s institutions ultimately survived the crisis, elections were held, the opposition won and Sall transferred power peacefully — precisely the kind of institutional resilience that remains elusive in many parts of the world.
The Burundi connection adds another layer to the African debate. President Évariste Ndayishimiye assumed the rotating chairmanship of the African Union in February 2026, shortly before Burundi formally presented Sall’s nomination. The March 2 letter was unequivocal about Burundi’s support, and the presence of Burundi’s Permanent Representative alongside Sall during subsequent African campaign engagements has underscored Bujumbura’s investment in his candidacy.
The support is politically valuable, but precision matters. Burundi was acting as the state holding the AU’s rotating presidency; the formal UN nomination document is a letter from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi, signed by Ambassador Maniratanga. It should therefore not automatically be interpreted as evidence of a collective AU endorsement agreed by the continent’s member states. Indeed, reporting surrounding the nomination noted that Sall’s possible candidacy had been discussed around the February AU summit without a formal collective decision being announced.
That ambiguity raises a larger question about Africa’s approach to the UN race. The continent regularly argues that it remains structurally underrepresented in international institutions. It demands permanent representation on the Security Council, greater influence in the international financial system and a stronger role in determining global rules. Yet converting those legitimate demands into influence also requires political coordination.
For Sall, this should theoretically be familiar terrain. Only four years ago he was chair of the African Union, sitting across summit tables from many of the same presidents and governments whose backing he now needs. He travelled internationally as one of Africa’s principal political voices and spoke for the continent on the consequences of the Ukraine war, food insecurity, development financing and global governance reform.
That experience is simultaneously one of his greatest advantages and an important test. If Sall cannot translate years of relationships with African leaders into substantial continental backing, questions will inevitably arise about Africa’s capacity to organise around its own candidates for global leadership positions. Conversely, a strong African coalition behind him would considerably strengthen his argument that the continent can move from demanding representation to exercising coordinated influence.
History strengthens the emotional case. Only two Africans have served as UN Secretary-General: Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali from 1992 to 1996 and Ghana’s Kofi Annan from 1997 to 2006. When Guterres leaves office at the end of 2026, it will have been two decades since an African last occupied the position. Sall would become the third if elected.
But neither history nor geography confers entitlement. Sall is competing in a crowded and politically complex field, and the eventual decision will turn on calculations extending far beyond regional rotation. Major powers will assess candidates through the prism of their own strategic interests, while smaller countries will look for independence, accessibility and commitment to the principles of the Charter.
Sall’s strongest case may therefore lie in presenting himself as a bridge: between Africa and the major powers, between developed and developing economies, between demands for greater UN spending on global challenges and demands for greater efficiency, and between countries defending the existing international order and those insisting that the system must be fundamentally rebalanced.
His campaign’s central proposition is that these positions need not be irreconcilable. Security Council reform can strengthen rather than weaken the UN. Greater attention to development can reduce threats to peace. Better representation can improve legitimacy. Administrative discipline can make multilateralism easier for governments to defend at home. Preventive diplomacy can be cheaper and more humane than managing wars after they erupt.
The difficulty is turning a compelling diagnosis into a winning diplomatic coalition.
Macky Sall enters that challenge with substantial assets: 12 years as a head of state, experience chairing the African Union, relationships across Africa and beyond, familiarity with global economic and security debates, and a campaign platform tailored to some of the deepest frustrations surrounding the United Nations.
He also carries political baggage that opponents will not ignore. His final years in Senegal will remain part of the conversation, as will questions about the depth of his support across Africa and whether permanent Security Council members view his reform agenda and political record favourably.
What has changed since March 2, 2026, however, is the seriousness of the candidacy. What began with a nomination transmitted by Burundi now has the official machinery of Senegal behind it. A successor who came to power promising a break with Sall has instructed Senegalese diplomats to campaign for him. Sall has taken his case directly to UN member states, stood before the General Assembly Hall at the candidates’ Town Hall and embarked on consultations spanning several geopolitical camps.
His argument remains strikingly simple despite the complexity of the contest. The United Nations is indispensable, but indispensability cannot become an excuse for inertia.
The institution must become more representative, more preventive, more efficient and more responsive to a world dramatically different from the one that created it in 1945. Africa must have a stronger voice, developing countries need a fairer international financial architecture, the Security Council must recover its ability to act, and the Secretary-General must rebuild trust among increasingly divided member states.
Whether Macky Sall is the person who can deliver that transformation is now for the international system to decide. But his candidacy has already placed an important question before Africa and the wider world: if almost everyone agrees that multilateralism is in crisis, who has the experience, political reach and courage to reform it before distrust turns into irrelevance?
For Sall, the answer is embodied in the title of the vision he placed before the United Nations on March 2: “Rebuilding Multilateralism for a Better World.” The coming months will determine whether enough of the world shares not only that vision, but confidence in the man proposing to lead it.
