By Prof Wafula Okumu*
The recent statements by the African Union on the escalating Iran crisis raise a difficult but necessary question: is it defending international law consistently — or practicing selective Charterism? Indeed, the AU is fully entitled to speak on global conflicts. Its Constitutive Act empowers it to promote peace, defend African common positions, and uphold international law within the framework of the United Nations Charter. Global instability affects African economies, maritime security, energy prices, and food systems. Silence would be irresponsible. However, the issue is not mandate. It is coherence.
The joint Israeli–American regicide adventure in Iran is illegal. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The only clear exceptions are Security Council authorisation, or Self-defence under Article 51 following an armed attack. Since the Security Council never approved the invasion, the legality of the violent regime change rests entirely on Article 51. But self-defence is not elastic. It requires necessity, proportionality, and — in cases of anticipatory self-defence — a demonstrably imminent armed attack. The threshold is high by design. The US and Israel have yet to convince the world that they were facing “imminent threat” to justify their regicide adventure. So far, no clear evidence has been proffered of an ongoing or imminent armed attack attributable to Iran. Obviously, the violent attack of Iran without Council authorisation and without satisfying Article 51 conditions risks violating Article 2(4) — a cornerstone of the post-1945 international order.
This is where the AU’s credibility is tested. The AU consistently champions sovereignty and territorial integrity, and prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force within Africa. It strongly condemns unconstitutional changes of government, political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities, and external interference. Yet in extra-continental crises, its language often defaults to broad calls for restraint rather than precise Charter analysis.
By condemning escalation but not explicitly anchoring its position in Article 2(4) and Article 51, the AU weakened the legal clarity of its stance. Additionally, it never denounced the violent invasion and acknowledged the legal framework of self-defence, making it appear politically aligned rather than legally grounded. Normative power is the AU’s greatest asset. It does not command military leverage in the Middle East. It does not sit permanently on the Security Council. Its influence lies in principled consistency.
A stronger AU position should therefore reaffirm the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4); recognise the narrow scope of self-defence under Article 51; and state clearly that unilateral force, absent Council authorisation and absent necessity and proportionality, violates international law.
That approach would not be pro-Iran or anti-West. It would be pro-Charter. It would also be the right way of promoting and defending “African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples.” Africa has long criticised powerful states for selective application of international law. To maintain credibility, the AU must avoid the same trap. The choice is not whether to speak — it is whether to speak with disciplined legal consistency. In moments like this, the AU’s voice matters. But its authority will depend less on volume and more on exactitude.
*Wafula Okumu is Executive Director of The Borders Institute in Nairobi, Kenya
